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THE NEW GLOBAL FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE:
WHY EGREGIOUS INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE FRAUD SHOULD BE
COGNIZABLE UNDER THE ALIEN TORT
CLAIMS ACT
JOEL SLAWOTSKY*
INTRODUCTION
1

In recent years, the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) has been
invoked in a wide range of settings against an array of foreign and
2
domestic corporations and individuals. An extremely controversial
3
statute, the ATCA allows aliens to file suit for international law
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& Rosenthal. He is a lecturer at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel and can be
reached at jslawotsky@idc.ac.il.
1. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (discussing claims against
the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization for bombings in Kenya); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d
932 (9th Cir. 2002) (alleging that oil company defendant aided and abetted murder, torture, and
enslavement of pipeline workers in Myanmar); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, No. 01 Civ. 8118 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 9, 2005) (discussing suit against pharmaceutical corporation conducting clinical trials in
Nigeria); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 361 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (examining claims for
alleged torture in Iraqi prisons); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing Vietnamese plaintiffs’ allegations of chemical company defendant
liability for injuries related to Agent Orange usage in the Vietnam war); In re S. African
Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (examining suit against financial
institutions for purported collaboration with apartheid regime in South Africa).
3. See, e.g., In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (“[T]his court must be
extremely cautious in permitting suits here based upon a corporation’s doing business in
countries with less than stellar human rights records, especially since the consequences of such
an approach could have significant, if not disastrous, effects on international commerce.”). See
also Recent Cases, Civil Procedure—Choice of Law—Ninth Circuit Uses International Law to
Decide Substantive Law Under Alien Tort Claims Act, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1525, 1531 (2003)
(noting that expansive ATCA liability “could strike deeply at the ability of parties to organize
their conduct and protect their expectations”); John E. Howard, Op-Ed., The Alien Tort Claims
Act: Is Our Litigation-Run-Amok Going Global?, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Oct. 2002,
http://www.uschamber.com/press/opeds/0210howarditigation.htm
(discussing
business
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violations in federal court.4
However, only international law
5
violations reflecting a mutual concern of the nations of the world are
cognizable under the ATCA.6
In a significant ATCA ruling, IIT v. Vencap, the Second Circuit
held that corporate fraud was not a violation of an international
7
norm, and was therefore not a cognizable tort under the ATCA.
According to Vencap and the subsequent decisions that have cited to
Vencap as precedent, while commercial fraud is a form of “stealing,”
it fails to constitute conduct condemned by the majority of nations. 8
Thus, according to Vencap and its progeny, corporate fraud may
constitute a several concern of some nations, but not the required
joint concern of most countries.
However, in 1975 when Vencap was decided, the global financial
landscape was vastly different.
The interconnection between
international equity and debt markets was limited. Derivatives9 were
in their nascent stage and posed relatively little risk to the world
economy.10 The instantaneous movement of capital with a mouse
click was non-existent. Globalization was proceeding, but at a slower

community’s concern that the ATCA is potentially damaging to international business and is
subject to litigation abuse).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
5. See, e.g., Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that
violations of international law can be based either on a treaty or a norm of international law).
6. Id. at 888 (“It is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong
is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express international accords, that a
wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation within the meaning of the
statute.”).
7. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
8. As recently as 2004, courts have relied upon Vencap as authority that corporate fraud is
not cognizable. See, e.g., Arndt v. Union Bank of Switz., 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (E.D.N.Y.
2004).
9. Derivatives are financial contracts designed to create pure price exposure to an
underlying commodity, asset, rate, index, or event. See Investorwords.com, Derivative
Definition, http://www.investorwords.com/1421/derivative.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2006), for a
definition of “derivatives.”
10. Legendary billionaire Warren Buffett and his partner, Charlie Munger, have warned
that the widespread usage of derivatives may cause a severe international economic crisis. See
Christopher Edmonds, Opinion, Buffett: Expect 6%-7% Returns From the Market,
THESTREET.COM, May 3, 2003, http://www.thestreet.com/_yahoo/comment/chrisedmonds/
10084972.html; see also Martin Mayer, The Danger of Derivatives, WALL ST. J, May 20, 1999, at
A20 (“[D]erivatives—created, sold and serviced behind closed doors by consenting adults who
don’t tell anybody what they’re doing—are also a major source of the almost unlimited leverage
that brought the world financial system to the brink of disaster last fall.”).
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pace.11 Concerns about international financing of terrorism and
12
money laundering were minimal at best. The potential financial
losses and damage to global economic order arising from a financial
implosion caused by fraud were modest and more significantly, were
containable to the local economy or immediate geographic area
where the collapse occurred. Given the realities of 1975, there was no
international consensus, let alone cooperation, regarding the
prevention of financial fraud.
Thirty years later, the world financial landscape is completely
unrecognizable.
National economies and capital markets are
13
intertwined, and a financial fiasco leading to severe financial loss can
have catastrophic effects around the world, both directly and
14
indirectly. While in 1975 financial deception leading to collapse
might have been disastrous for a particular local or regional economy,
today’s financial implosion could cause huge losses on an
international scale.
For example, the amount of outstanding
derivatives contracts traded over the counter totaled approximately
$10 trillion by the close of 2005.15 By the end of the first quarter of
2006, the amount of outstanding derivatives contracts traded on
formal exchanges totaled $25 trillion and over $50 trillion for options

11. Notwithstanding the perception that globalization is a new phenomenon, globalization
has been progressing for hundreds of years. See generally Michael D. Bordo et al., Is
Globalization Today Really Different than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago? (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7195, 1999).
12. Recent terrorist atrocities have raised the level of concern regarding the financing of
terrorism. Kevin J. Fandl, Recalibrating The War on Terror by Enhancing Development
Practices in the Middle East, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 299, 299 (2006) (“Only recently, with
the attacks on the United States, Spain, and the United Kingdom, has the awareness of
terrorism in the Western world intensified.”). See also International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature Jan. 10, 2000, 2178 U.N.T.S.
229, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000) (showing a U.N. convention regarding financing of terrorist activities);
Financing Terrorism Looking in the Wrong Places, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2005,
http://economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5053373.
13. See, e.g., John W. Head, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis: The Role of the IMF
and the United States, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 70, 89-90 (1998) (“[E]conomic collapse in any
Asian country . . . is bad news for the rest of Asia and potentially for the rest of the world.”).
14. See Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords As Soft Law: Strengthening International
Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1998) (“[O]ne attendant risk arising from the
growth of financial globalization is the potential for international financial crises which disrupt
macroeconomic performance.”).
15. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL
BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS statistical annex at A103, tbl.19 (Sept.
2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa0609.pdf.
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on those contracts.16 The leverage in the global economy, and thus
the attendant risk thereto, is staggering.
Given the profound changes in the international financial
markets, as well as the growing recognition that fraud poses a danger
to global financial stability, this Article suggests that automatically
holding financial fraud not cognizable pursuant to the ATCA is no
longer valid given the new reality of our interwoven capital markets.
Avoiding massive corporate fraud is not merely one nation’s interest,
but rather a crucial foundation underpinning the international
economic structure. Preventing “Enron-like” financial implosions,
failed banking systems, evisceration of tens of billions in market
value, substantial job loss, destruction of employees’ retirement
savings, plummeting real estate valuations, and economic collapse
caused by corporate fraud constitutes the quintessential example of
an international norm. Therefore, select egregious corporate fraud
that results in severe financial collapse, economic damage, and wealth
destruction is a violation of an international norm, and should be
17
actionable under the ATCA.
I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FINANCIAL
LANDSCAPE AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION SINCE
VENCAP
A. Globalization and the Rise of the Multinational Corporation
The dangers to the international economy associated with a
financial fiasco dwarf the dangers formerly present in the 1970s, or
even the 1980s. It is incontrovertible that the global economy in the
opening decade of the twenty-first century bears little resemblance to
the one in 1975 when Vencap was decided. Three decades postVencap, business is conducted on a hitherto unimaginable scale.
Commercial enterprises operate globally, developing cutting-edge
technology,18 searching for new sources of raw materials,19 testing

16. Id. statistical annex at A108, tbl.23A.
17. This Article is not suggesting that garden-variety acts of fraud such as insider trading,
executive compensation abuse, or other criminal action, which does not result in serious damage
to the world economy, should be cognizable. The conduct suggested to be cognizable is
egregious deception resulting in severe wealth evisceration.
18. See, e.g., Intel, Intel in Your Community: Israel, http://www.intel.com/community/
israel/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) (noting development of Intel Corporation’s Centrino Chip at
its research center in Haifa, Israel).
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products,20 outsourcing professional services,21 and operating
22
production facilities.
Standing at the vanguard of this world with virtual borders are
large international titans of capitalism, including large multinational
23
With evercorporations (MNCs) based in the United States.
24
advancing technology, instantaneous movement of capital,25 and the
26
explosion of trade markets, these huge MNCs have created a new
financial dynamic facilitating unprecedented economic growth and
transformation. MNCs are at the pinnacle of our new global
27
economy and enjoy staggering financial power. As corporations

19. See, e.g., China National Petroleum Corporation, Overseas Oil and Gas Operations,
http://www.cnpc.com.cn/english/inter/OverseasOil.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) (explaining
how China’s large oil corporations are vigorously searching around the globe in order to find
new sources of crude oil, and noting that China’s National Petroleum Company has oil
exploration projects worldwide).
20. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 01 Civ. 8118, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005) (discussing an ATCA suit involving an American pharmaceutical
corporation that conducted clinical trials in Nigeria during a meningitis outbreak).
21. See, e.g., About Outside Counsel, www.outsidecounsel.net/about.html (last visited Aug.
7, 2006) (showing how legal services for U.S. corporations are being performed overseas).
22. See, e.g., Nikebiz.com, Jobs: Asia Pacific, http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?
page=33 (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) (showing that Nike offers job opportunities in production
facilities throughout Asia).
23. Unquestionably, large MNCs are becoming more powerful and influential. However,
over-regulation of MNCs risks severe economic opportunity loss for the MNCs, the local
population, and the global economy. See Vijay K. Nagaraj & Nithya V. Raman, Are We
Prepared for Another Bhopal? (Dec. 2004), http://www.india-seminar.com/2004/544/544%
20nagaraj,%20raman.htm (“[O]ver-regulation of multinational corporations can drive away
investment, reducing the wealth of the nation and the number of available jobs.”); see also
Curtis Bradley, The Costs of Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 471-73 (2001)
(noting that expansive MNC liability endangers U.S. business interests).
24. According to technology experts, 4G describes an environment where radio access
methods will be able to inter-operate to provide communications sessions that can seamlessly
“hand-off” between them. More than any other technology, 4G will have a profound impact on
the entire wireless landscape. See, e.g., 4G.co.uk, About 4G, http://www.4g.co.uk/about4g.html
(last visited Oct. 27, 2006); see also Wireless Week, http://www.wirelessweek.com (last visited on
Aug. 7, 2006) (breaking the latest technology news).
25. See, e.g., TD Ameritrade, http://www.tdameritrade.com (last visited Aug. 7, 2006)
(noting that capital can be transferred between banks and brokerage accounts with a mouse
click and large amounts of capital can be invested in specialized exchange traded funds,
American depository receipts, and single country mutual funds).
26. See Press Release, World Trade Org., Developing Countries’ Goods Trade Share
Surges to 50-Year Peak (Apr. 14, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/
pr401_e.htm (“[D]eveloping countries saw their share in world merchandise trade rise sharply in
2004 to 31%, the highest percentage since 1950, according to WTO figures released on 14 April
2005.”).
27. See Stephen G. Wood & Brett G. Scharffs, Applicability of Human Rights Standards to
Private Corporations: An American Perspective, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. SUP. 531, 538-39 (2002)
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have become larger, any MNC mega-meltdown will potentially cause
substantially more severe financial losses, both locally and globally
than in 1975.
B. Globalized Financial Markets, Technological Innovation, and the
Internet—The New Autobahn of Commerce
Along with massive opportunities, the risk of a global financial
meltdown is higher now than ever before because of our autobahn
global economy. Thirty years after Vencap, new information systems
permit real-time gathering and dissemination of information twentyfour hours a day, seven days a week.
Commercial internet
transactions, e-payment systems, and other technological innovations
were unknown when Vencap was decided. New technology and
products that enable both business and individuals to communicate
and conduct business faster, invest globally, retrieve and disseminate
information, and link the world, are released with increasing
frequency.28
One of the most affected areas of the global financial system has
been financial services and investment. Technology and globalization
have united to produce new financial trading centers which bridge the
29
time zone gaps between traditional trading centers. The proposed
$20 billion “merger of equals” between the New York Stock
Exchange and Euronext will create the world’s first global stock
exchange which is anticipated to trade companies with a combined
30
$27 trillion market capitalization. The new stock exchange, an MNC
in its own right, will have offices in New York, London, Paris, and
Amsterdam.31

(noting that as of the early 1990s about thirty-seven thousand MNCs existed, and that the gross
sales of several MNCs exceeded the GDPs of many nations); Bruce Mazlish, Perspectives on
Globalization from Developing States: A Tour of Globalization, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
5, 12 (1999) (“[M]ultinationals are wealthier than about 120-130 nation-State members of the
United Nations.”).
28. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Technology, http://www.nytimes.com/pages/technology/ (last
visited Aug. 7, 2006) (showcasing examples of new technology and products).
29. See, e.g., Gold Lifts Trading on Bourse, GULF DAILY NEWS (Bahr.), Aug. 7, 2006,
available at http://www.gulf-daily-news.com/arc_printnews.asp?Article=151825 (noting that
Dubai has opened a gold trading market which bridges the time gap between the Far East and
London gold trading).
30. News Release, NYSE Group, NYSE Group and Euronext N.V. Agree to a Merger of
Equals (June 1, 2006), http://www.nyse.com/press/1149157439121.html.
31. Id. (“NYSE Euronext will be a U.S. holding company, the shares of which will be listed
on the NYSE, trading in U.S. dollars, and on Euronext Paris, trading in Euros. Its U.S.
headquarters will be located in New York, and its international headquarters in Paris and
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Cutting-edge breakthroughs in technology and pioneering
advances in investment possibilities have combined to transform and
add significant leverage in the world financial markets. The huge
derivatives market,32 as well as the newer contracts for difference
33
(CFDs), are examples of this incredible leverage. New financial
market innovations permit the buying and selling of both debt and
equity via electronic communication networks (ECNs).34 Today, large
amounts of capital can be instantaneously transferred in and out of a
35
variety of investment vehicles. Not only is there a wide array of
shares to buy and sell on formal exchanges and the over-the-counter
36
markets, but a virtual galaxy of exchange traded funds, or ETFs, also
exist. These investment vehicles focus on single themes such as
country-specific or region-specific equity indexes, oil, gold, and
numerous other categories. They have attracted gargantuan sums of
capital since their recent introduction. By June 2006, over $335
billion in assets were invested in U.S. ETFs.37 At the end of March
38
2006, nearly $300 billion was invested in U.S. closed-end funds.
Worldwide, nearly $20 trillion was invested in mutual funds.39

Amsterdam (which will be the centers of operations for its international activities), with London
as the centre for its derivatives business.”).
32. See, e.g., supra note 16 and accompanying text (referencing the $75 trillion worth of
outstanding derivatives contracts and options on those contracts).
33. CFDs are “contracts for difference” that allow investors to make very highly leveraged
bets on various financial products including shares, foreign exchange, precious metals, and
bonds.
See Contracts for Difference and CFD Trading, http://www.contracts-fordifference.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2006); see also GCI Financial, http://www.gcitrading.com/
cfd-trading.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006) (showing an example of where CFDs are traded).
34. Many ECNs allow trading after-hours and sometimes even for twenty-four hours. Most
of these ECN systems were not created until the late 1990s.
See, e.g., Instinet,
http://www.instinet.com/index2.jsp (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); NASDAQTrader.com,
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com; Bloomberg.com, http://www.bloomberg.com/index.html?Intro=
intro2 (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
35. For example, according to the U.S. Treasury, “the two [major] international electronic
funds transfer systems handle over $6 trillion in wire transfers” daily. United States
Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, International Overview,
http://www.fincen.gov/int_main.html (last visited June 20, 2006).
36. ETFs are “a type of investment company whose investment objective is to achieve the
same return as a particular market index.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
Exchange-Traded Funds, http://www.sec.gov/answers/etf.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
37. Exchange-Traded Fund Assets: June 2006, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, July 27,
2006, http://www.ici.org/stats/etf/etfs_06_06.html #TopOfPage.
38. Closed-End Fund Assets: First Quarter 2006, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, June
6, 2006, http://www.ici.org/stats/latest/cef_q1_06.html#TopOfPage.
39. See Worldwide Mutual Fund Assets and Flows: First Quarter 2006, INVESTMENT
COMPANY INSTITUTE, Aug. 3, 2006, http://www.ici.org/stats/latest/ww_03_06.html#TopOfPage.
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In addition to the investment choices in “traditional markets,”40
investment options in countries that were once unthinkable are now
rapidly developing. In 1975, there was a cold war between the former
Soviet Union and the United States. Thirty years after Vencap there
is substantial free-market development in Russia as well as the former
“Eastern Bloc” and both equity and debt markets in these formerly
communist nations are undergoing rapid development.41 China has
also opened its doors, and the “Great Wall” is rapidly becoming the
42
“Great Mall.”
Both the potential rewards and risks have become magnified as a
result of the financial and technological revolutions that have
overtaken the world equity, debt, and forex markets. While the
dangers associated with market risk may be assuaged through
prudent hedging or insurance, the risk associated with financial
collapse due to a grandiose fraud cannot be underestimated.
II. THE SECULAR BULL MARKET IN FINANCIAL FRAUD
AND SCANDAL
A. The “Old” Financial Fraud
Although corporate fraud has occurred in prior decades, these
early deceptions generally did not have significant potential to cause
widespread international financial turmoil. For example, in the 1970s,
several Wall Street firms collapsed due to “technological
43
incompetence and lack of capital.” In the 1980s, the phrase “greed is
44
good” became a generational symbol for insider trading scandals,
including the crumbling of Drexel Burnham Lambert and the Savings
45
and Loan scandal. However, as globalization grew in the 1990s, the

40. Examples of traditional markets are the United States, Canada, United Kingdom,
Continental Europe, and Japan.
41. See, e.g., Russian Trading System Stock Exchange, http://www.rts.ru/?tid=541 (last
visited Aug. 7, 2006).
42. See Pepe Escobar, The Great Wall of Shopping, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (H.K.), Jan. 14,
2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GA14Ad04.html.
43. Gretchen Morgenson, Rebound from Ruin, If Not from Distrust, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2002, § 3, at 1.
44. In the movie Wall Street, the character Gordon Gekko, addressing a shareholder
meeting, states, “I am not a destroyer of companies. I am a liberator of them! The point is,
ladies and gentlemen, that greed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right, greed
works.” WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987).
45. See
John
Greenwald,
Predator’s
Fall,
TIME.COM,
Feb
26,
1990,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,969468,00.html (describing the collapse and
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risks to world economic order grew as well. The implosion of LongTerm Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 demonstrated the
potential international ramifications of an implosion in a single
country.46 LTCM, a specialist in trading government bonds, employed
derivatives to obtain significant leverage to significantly increase
profits. Unfortunately, the derivatives also added tremendous risk to
LTCM’s portfolio, and when market conditions eroded, LTCM
collapsed and had to be rescued to avoid banking and brokerage
failures in the American financial system. The Asian currency crisis
of the late 1990s also demonstrated the perils of financial contagion,
which is the risk that a financial crisis in one nation will spread and
afflict the financial system of other nations.47 Financial contagion has
been defined as “the cross-country transmission of shocks or the
48
general cross-country spillover effects.”
B. The “New” Financial Fraud
The “fraud bull” shows no sign of slowdown. Indeed, scandals
involving deceit in both American and international corporations are
49
continuing at a torrid pace. However, it is crucial to appreciate the
bankruptcy of Drexel Burnham); John K. Villa, That’s Where the Money is: Bank Crimes Move
Beyond Robbery to Fraud, 9 BUS. L. TODAY 32 (May/June 2000), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/blt00may-money.html (“Many of the most serious problems
uncovered in the S&L crisis involved insiders who phonied the books to make a sick financial
institution appear healthy. That was often accomplished by buying uncollectible loans out of
the bank with the proceeds of new, and probably equally uncollectible loans, before the bank
examiners arrived.”).
46. See Press Briefing, Int’l Monetary Fund, Press Conference on the IMF’s Annual
International Capital Markets Report (Sept. 11, 2000), https://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2000/
tr000911.htm; see Wall Street Rescue for Hedge Funds, BBC NEWS, Sept. 25, 1998,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/179884.stm (“Long-Term Capital Management specialised in
bond arbitrage, trying to exploit differences in the price of government debt in different
countries. It is believed to have lost heavily when Russia effectively defaulted on its short-term
GKO bonds last month. At the beginning of September it admitted that its capital base had
shrunk by half, to $2.3bn. But because of its use of so-called derivatives, the fund’s exposure
was estimated at $40bn to $80bn—the sum total of the bets it had made around the world about
the direction of bonds.”).
47. See Int’l Monetary Fund Staff, The Asian Crisis: Causes and Cures, FINANCE &
DEVELOPMENT, June 1998, at 18, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/
06/pdf/imfstaff.pdf.
48. Contagion of Financial Crises, The World Bank Group (Sept. 15, 2000),
http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/managing%20volatility/contagion/definitions.html#
broad.
49. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI):
The FBI has not observed any major changes in criminal trends relating to Corporate
Fraud. It is anticipated that the number of cases will continue to flourish. The FBI is
committed to this problem. It remains the #1 priority within the Financial Crimes
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different nature of the current scandals as opposed to the impact from
the “old financial fraud” of prior decades. The “new financial fraud”
is notorious for the depth of financial depravity and is qualitatively
different. The recent Enron scandal is one example of the impact of
“new financial fraud”: “In a matter of months, a bad crop of U.S.
corporate executives incinerated trillions of dollars in wealth and
destroyed the lives of thousands of innocent employees.”50 As worldrenowned financier Felix Rohatyn stated, the previous collapses
“didn’t cost 50,000 jobs, people’s savings and a decline in market
value of trillions of dollars . . . [t]his [situation] is not about a bunch of
51
rogue CEOs.”
A review of a single day’s Wall Street Journal speaks volumes as
to the extent of the financial scandal plaguing the world. In only one
day’s Wall Street Journal the following was reported: the former
CEO of Health South, Richard Scrushy, was convicted of bribery in
52
his attempt to obtain a seat on a state regulatory panel; large
companies Apple Computer and Computer Associates disclosed
“irregularities” with respect to the dating of stock options to key
executives;53 over fifty companies are being investigated by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and prosecutors with
respect to option dating and numerous officers and directors have
either been terminated or have resigned over these scandals;54 the
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission filed a complaint
against BP PLC for purported manipulation of the propane futures

Section. There are presently 405 Corporate Fraud cases being pursued by FBI field
offices throughout the United States. This represents a 100 percent increase over the
number of Corporate Fraud cases pending at the end of Fiscal Year 2003. Eighteen of
the current pending cases involve losses to public investors which individually exceed
$1 billion. The volume of cases has yet to reach a plateau, with three to six new cases
being initiated each month.
FINANCIAL CRIMES SECTION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FINANCIAL CRIMES
REPORT TO THE PUBLIC: CORPORATE FRAUD (2005), available at http://www.fbi.gov/
publications/financial/fcs_report052005/fcs_report052005.htm#b1.
50. Editorial, Pinstripes to Prison Stripes, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2004, at B-14.
51. Morgenson, supra note 43 (citing notable financier Felix Rohatyn and calling the Enron
and WorldCom legacies a “greater and longer-lasting impact on the economy” than previous
scandals because they involved “venerable financial institutions . . . at the heart of the . . .
debacles”).
52. See Valerie Bauerlein, Scrushy is Convicted in Bribery Case—Prosecutors Savor Victory
Over HealthSouth Ex-CEO After ‘05 Fraud Acquittal, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006, at A3.
53. James Bandler, Nick Wingfield & William M. Bulkeley, Apple and CA Report
Problems in Options Grants, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006, at A3.
54. Id.
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market;55 and alleged breaches of fiduciary duties on the part of senior
56
management led to a prosecutorial raid on a South Korean Bank.
While such news underscores the frequency of financial
gamesmanship, it is the high profile financial failures that have caused
a sharp erosion of the public’s trust in corporations. A cavalcade of
high profile corporate failures has eroded corporate images
57
Well-respected firms, such as Enron, WorldCom,
worldwide.
Healthsouth, Adelphia Communications, Royal Dutch, and many
others,58 have placed a spotlight on the potential for corporate
59
misconduct. There are even trading cards focusing on corporate
60
scandal.
In addition, while most attention is usually riveted to the huge
losses stemming from the plunge in share prices, that loss may be
dwarfed by non-stock market losses. Indeed, although equity and
debt markets are very significant, there are other serious financial
ramifications such as lost salaries, lost retirement savings, increased
foreclosures, and lower values for real estate. The income reduction
due to job destruction may dwarf the losses in equity and debt
markets.
1. Examples of the “New” Financial Fraud. The surge in highly
unethical behavior is not relegated to one particular type of fraud or
one particular genre of defendant. The diversity of actors is
substantial and ranges from traders, banks, junior level employees,

55. See Chip Cummins, A Glimpse Inside BP Trading—Documents in Fresh Complaints
Reveal Dealing-Room Strategies; Sharing of ‘Lessons Learned,’ WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006, at
C1.
56. See Jeongjin Lim & Lina Yoon, Prosecutors Raid South Korea Bank—Move Against
KEB Comes After Audit Finds Fault With 2003 Sale of Lender, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006, at
C3.
57. Corporate scandals involving corporations such as WorldCom and Enron have led to a
substantial distrust of corporations. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley: A Price Worth Paying?, THE
ECONOMIST, May 19, 2005, at 70, available at http://www.economist.com/business/display
Story.cfm?story_ id=3984019.
58. For example, in October 2005, approximately two months after going public, the
commodities trading firm Refco filed for bankruptcy due to an accounting scandal. The Refco
bankruptcy is believed to be the fourth largest to date. Large amounts of public investor money
were lost and confidence in the market was lessened. See Eric Dash & Jenny Anderson, How a
Big Investor Fell into the Refco Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at C4.
59. See generally REBECCA SMITH & JOHN R. EMSHWILLER, 24 DAYS: HOW TWO WALL
STREET JOURNAL REPORTERS UNCOVERED THE LIES THAT DESTROYED FAITH IN
CORPORATE AMERICA (2003).
60. David Plotz, Corporate Scandal Trading Cards: Collect ‘Em All, SLATE, July 19, 2002,
http://www.slate.com/id/2068382/.
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and law firms to the highest echelon of corporate management.61
Rogue financial traders have set up fake trades purportedly making
62
International banks have
money while in truth losing billions.
63
committed fraud to the tune of billions.
WorldCom management perpetrated a huge financial hoax
through accounting fraud totaling over $3 billion.64 Once the second
largest communications corporation, WorldCom executives
65
committed fraud and deceived investors on a grand scale.
WorldCom’s financial problems led to the firing of seventeen
66
thousand employees and caused severe economic dislocation.
Another multi-billion dollar accounting fraud was perpetrated by
67
This involved
large hospital chain owner HealthSouth.
manipulation of the corporation’s financial records and the
fabrication of accounting entries.68
The biggest corporate scandal of 2005 was the collapse of Refco
months after issuing equity shares to the public. Refco was a major

61. See, e.g., supra notes 52, 58; infra notes 64, 90-101 and accompanying text; Crisis
Meeting Over $750m Bank Fraud, BBC NEWS, Feb. 8, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/business/1806431.stm (noting that Allied Irish Banks suffered a nearly one billion dollar
fraud-related loss). Enron’s principal outside counsel, Vinson & Elkins (V&E), was sued on the
basis that the firm participated with and helped Enron with respect to its corporate fraud. See
generally In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivatives & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex.
2002). V&E moved to dismiss the claims but the court refused, holding that the firm could
potentially be liable. Id. at 704-05. V&E settled the litigation for $30 million. The Associated
Press, Vinson & Elkins to Pay Enron $30 Million to Settle Claims, LAW.COM, June 2, 2006,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1149152717089. Other prestigious law firms are also
being sued for their alleged involvement in the fraudulent schemes of their clients. The
National Law Journal, Creative Litigation Ensnares Outside Counsel in Shareholder Suits,
LAW.COM, Jan. 24, 2006, http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticleIHC.jsp?id=1138023312254
(describing allegations that law firms representing Refco and Adelphia Communications aided
their clients to commit fraud).
62. See William Leith, How to Lose a Billion, THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 26, 2002, at
34, available at http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,3604,818620,00.html.
63. Jill Treanor, BCCI Settlement Costs Top $1.2bn, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 15,
2003, at 18, available at http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,3604,956218,00.html; see also
Japan’s $1-Billion Scam, ASIAWEEK, Oct. 27, 1995, available at http://www.asiaweek.com/
asiaweek/95/1027/biz2.html (describing fraud at Japan’s Daiwa bank).
64. WorldCom’s Woes, FORBES.COM, Aug. 9, 2002, http://www.forbes.com/2002/06/26/
worldcom.html.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Carrie Johnson, 5 Years for HealthSouth Fraud, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2005, at D01.
68. See Fifth Chief Financial Officer at HealthSouth to Admit Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2003, at C13; Milt Freudenheim, HealthSouth Audit Finds as Much as $ 4.6 Billion in Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at C2; Reed Abelson, HealthSouth’s Bondholders Await Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at C1.
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commodities and futures contracts brokerage with 200,000
69
customers. In August 2005, Refco went public at $22 a share and the
shares jumped twenty-five percent in one day.70 The market
capitalization was approximately $4 billion.71
Although Refco
claimed $75 billion in assets at the time of its initial public offering
(IPO), in October 2005, it subsequently conceded assets of $16
billion.72 Shortly after going public, Refco admitted that an internal
audit revealed a $430 million receivable owed to Refco by an entity
73
controlled by CEO Phillip Bennett. Bennett is alleged to have
engaged in off-setting transactions with a hedge fund client of Refco
74
at the end of each quarter to keep the bad debt off Refco’s books.
75
Eventually, Refco filed for bankruptcy. In March 2006, it became
known that Refco had $525 million in worthless bonds in offshore
76
Creditors alleged that Bennett had been fraudulently
accounts.
maintaining the firm’s records for years.77 Refco shares during
January 2007 were trading at around forty cents.78 At least one
79
mutual fund has been adversely affected.
80
Corporate fraud is not limited to American MNCs. According
to SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman, “corporate scandals were
not specific to the United States. With the revelation of fraud and
corporate governance abuses at Parmalat, Hollinger, Royal Ahold,
and others, it became apparent that the issues and need for reform
raised by the U.S. scandals were in fact confronting the markets and
regulatory regimes globally.”81

69. Abelson, supra note 68.
70. Refco, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Refco (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See OTC Bulletin Board Info Center, http://www.otcbb.com/asp/Info_Center.asp
(search “Symbol” for “RFXCQ”) (last visited Jan. 7, 2007).
79. Alistair Barr, Rydex Sphinx Fund Hit by Refco demise, MARKETWATCH, Dec. 30, 2005,
http://www.marketwatch.com/ (search for “Rydex Sphinx fund hit by Refco demise”).
80. See An Enron Plea That Reverberates, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2004, at F02 (calling the
recent European scandals the “Chapter 2” to Enron’s “first chapter in the corporate
scandal saga”).
81. Cynthia A. Glassman, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. and Exchange Comm’n, Remarks before the
European Corporate Governance Summit, An SEC Commissioner’s View: The Post-Sarbanes-
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Europe’s Parmalat now stands under investigation for the
“disappearance” of €10 billion, earning the Italian giant the nickname
82
“Europe’s Enron.” The British securities authority has accused
Royal Dutch Shell of “‘unprecedented misconduct’ for misleading the
83
markets over the reporting of oil and gas reserves.” The company
has admitted that it overstated its future reserves of crude oil—the
lifeblood of an energy corporation’s future revenue—by twenty-five
84
percent.
During the trading session following its admission, £3
billion was wiped off its market capitalization.85
Another recent scandal has earned a company the title “Enron of
86
Spain.” Allegedly, a Spanish postage stamp company assured stamp
buyers “guaranteed annual returns of six to ten percent in their stamp
collection investments, depending on how many years they held the
stamps.”87 Evidently, these stamps could be bought for “one-tenth”
of what the company valued the stamps.88 “The allegation is that
rather than earning investment returns, early investors were simply
being paid out of revenues that later investors brought to the party—
essentially a Ponzi scheme.”89
2. Enron’s Conduct and Impact. While the above examples
illustrate the rampant scandals of recent years, Enron Corporation’s
machinations, and subsequent collapse, provides the archetype
example of conduct that should be cognizable under the ATCA. The

Oxley Environment for Foreign Issuers (Mar. 2, 2005), (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch030205cag.htm).
82. Deborah Hargreaves, Market Insight: Impact of ‘Europe’s Enron’ Pales Next to the
Original, THE FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 2004, at 44.
83. Terry Macalister, Shell’s Shame: FSA Spells out Abuse, THE GUARDIAN (London),
Aug. 25, 2004, at 22, available at http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,3604,1290141,00.html.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Richard Behar, ‘Enron of Spain’ Fallout Ripples Into U.S. Markets, FOXNEWS.COM,
June 8, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,198526,00.html (“Some experts are calling it
the ‘Enron of Spain,’ the biggest financial scam that country has ever known. A Spanish
prosecutor has warned it might have ‘grave repercussions for the Spanish economy.’ And now,
the shock waves are rippling into U.S. markets, where the full effects are still unknown.”).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. “Ponzi schemes are a type of illegal pyramid scheme named for Charles Ponzi, who
duped thousands of New England residents into investing in a postage stamp speculation
scheme back in the 1920s . . . Decades later, the Ponzi scheme continues to work on the ‘robPeter-to-pay-Paul’ principle, as money from new investors is used to pay off earlier investors
until the whole scheme collapses.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Ponzi”
Schemes, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2007).
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Enron fraud is one of the biggest financial debacles ever and has
served to focus attention on the outrageous fraud committed by some
90
corporate behemoths.
91
The defunct energy trader was a major employer and at its
92
zenith, the seventh-largest corporation in America. Enron shares
were a highly touted investment and considered by many wellrespected analysts and commentators as a “must own” stock. Fortune
listed Enron as one of “10 Stocks to Last the Decade.”93 Fortune also
praised Enron “as America’s most innovative firm for five years
94
running.” In 1999, CFO Magazine named Enron’s Chief Financial
Officer (CFO), Andrew Fastow, “CFO of the Year.”95
While Enron appeared to be in excellent financial health—a
highly successful corporation creating a surge in wealth for both
96
investors and employees alike —the truth was quite the opposite.
Enron was not a giant profit generator, but was rather involved in a
myriad of deceptions and frauds. The more spirited and creative
outrageous misconduct of Enron includes: creating a fake trading
97
area to deceive analysts, business partners, and investors; recording
fraudulent transactions intended to simultaneously hide substantial
losses and create large imaginary profits;98 and establishing a myriad
90. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Van Niel & Nancy B. Rapoport, Dr. Jekyll & Mr. Skilling: How
Enron’s Public Image Morphed from the Most Innovative Company in the Fortune 500 to the
Most Notorious Company Ever, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 77
(Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004); KURT EICHENWALD, CONSPIRACY OF
FOOLS: A TRUE STORY (2005).
91. Prior to bankruptcy, Enron employed nearly twenty thousand people. See Dan
Ackman, Enron the Incredible, FORBES.COM, Jan. 15, 2002, http://www.forbes.com/2002/01/15/
0115enron.html.
92. Id.
93. Fortune described Enron as possibly continuing with a twenty-five percent per year
increase in earnings, in part because of broadband. David Rynecki, 10 Stocks to Last the
Decade, FORTUNE, Aug. 14, 2000, at 118.
94. William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1275, 1276 (2002).
95. Russ Banham, The Finest in Finance: Andrew S. Fastow, Capital Structure Management,
CFO MAG., Oct. 1, 1999, at 62.
96. Enron claimed its sales rose from $13 billion in 1996 to $100 billion in 2000 and claimed
they would double again by 2002, which would have made it the world’s second biggest
corporation in terms of sales. See Ackman, supra note 91.
97. Jason Leopold, Questioning the Books: Enron Executives Helped to Create Fake
Trading Room, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, at A4 (“Former Enron Corp. Chief Executive Ken
Lay and former President Jeff Skilling were personally involved in stage-managing a fake
trading room to impress analysts.”).
98. See Bratton, supra note 94, at 1286 (examining Enron’s use of special purpose entities
to fraudulently conceal losses and generate earnings).
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of sham offshore entities to both evade fraud detection and to record
99
Eventually the fraud became public, and
non-existent earnings.
soon thereafter Enron filed for bankruptcy. As a result of the fraud,
Enron’s shares became nearly worthless, causing tremendous loss to
investors, wiping out employees’ retirement savings that in many
cases constituted their life’s savings, eviscerating thousands of jobs,
and resulting in overall severe long-term financial ruin for thousands
of families.100 The brazenness of Enron’s top management was
breathtaking: “Enron’s principals abused the system in plain view,
taking advantage of the considerable slack it extends to successful
actors. Although they did not disclose everything, they disclosed
more than enough to put the system’s layers of monitors on notice
that their earnings numbers were soft and their liabilities
understated.”101
A dramatic example of the smoke and mirrors used by Enron
was the presentation of Enron Energy Service’s (EES) purported
“war room.” The “war room” was a surreal Hollywood-like
environment where analysts and investors were shown an illusion of a
booming, hugely profitable business: a massive open space room,
throngs of employees all seemingly intensely working on the phone or
at desks or staring at computer screens, allegedly finalizing
102
transactions and making profitable trades. Huge overhead screens
showed the sites of EES’s many purported contracts and prospects.
Real-time commodity prices were displayed on a continuous basis.103
“It was impressive,” according to Merrill Lynch stock analyst John
104
Unfortunately for Enron’s business partners, employees,
Olson.
and investors, the EES “war room” was bogus. The entire sham
trading room had been staged. The visitors to the “war room” were
99. David Barboza, Ex-Executives Say Sham Deal Helped Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2002, at A1 (discussing Enron’s use of sham deals to meet year-end profit targets).
100. Former Enron employees have suffered severe financial hardship including losing their
retirement savings, being forced to return to work after retirement, and home foreclosures. See
Julie Appleby, Many Who Lost Savings, Jobs Pleased, USA TODAY, May 26, 2006, available at
http://usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/2006-05-25-enron-workers-usat_x.htm
(“After
Enron went bankrupt in 2001, [Rinard, a former Enron employee] and his wife, Vicki, had to
sell their home and buy a much smaller one. Like many other former Enron employees, they
gave up plans for travel, retirement and helping the grandkids.”).
101. Bratton, supra note 94, at 1283.
102. Leopold, supra note 97.
103. See id.
104. Olson raised questions concerning Enron and was fired by Merill Lynch. BETHANY
MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND
SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 180 (2003).
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deluded into believing what they observed was accurate.105 Top
management was convicted of defrauding the public in violation of
106
numerous federal laws.
III. FINANCIAL CONTAGION
American titans of capitalism can no longer be considered
immune from the effects of foreign-based financial scandals. World
capital markets, the foundation of financial growth, are, in essence,
moving forward toward international financial integration.107 For
108
example, the New York Stock Exchange and Euronext are merging.
Unlike 1975, there is now a realistic danger of a domino effect as an
“Enron-type” fraud may cause a financial storm to spread to the
United States from overseas. Leading academic institutions have
established programs to study financial contagion.109 As stated by the
European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services,
Higher levels of integration and concentration are increasing the
number of cross-border financial institutions, which raises
challenges in controlling and managing systemic risk. Financial
stability was traditionally a national responsibility, but these new
market structures mean that there is a need for greater
international co-operation, information exchange and, where
110
appropriate, formal arrangements.

The European Commissioner added, “The corporate scandals of
recent years and the fallout that they created underlined how
interdependent our economies really are. It is our job as regulators to
come up with frameworks that, to the extent possible, bring about

105. Id. at 179-80. See also Leopold, supra note 97.
106. See Christopher Palmeri, Guilty Verdicts for Enron Brass, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE,
May 25, 2006, http://businessweek.com/investor/content/may2006/pi20060525_754989.htm.
107. See Lee, supra note 14, at 10 (“Modern banks conduct diversified operations across
borders to diversify their earning sources and enhance their profits. Advances in data
processing and telecommunications have enabled banks to offer global services easily, even
without establishing a physical presence in some markets.”); see also Pierre Fleuriot, Financial
Regulation As the Safeguard of Balances in a Global Context, in FINANCIAL MARKETS
REGULATION 33, 33 (Alain Jeunemaitre ed., 1997).
108. See NYSE Group, NYSE Group and Euronext Agree to Merge, http://www.nyse.com/
about/newsevents/1149243292355.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); see also supra notes 30-31 and
accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance, Research Projects,
http://www.cerf.cam.ac.uk/research/index.php?current=4 (last visited June 22, 2006).
110. Charlie McCreevy, European Comm’r for Internal Mkts. and Servs., Opening Address
to the 4th INFINITI Conference on International Finance: Globalization and Financial Services
(June 12, 2006), (transcript available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
Reference=SPEECH/06/365&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en).
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financial stability and reduce the risk of contagion of financial
111
crises.”
An example of this concern arose from the fallout from Enron’s
financial collapse. Enron Australia’s liquidation led to concern and
speculation regarding the International Swaps and Derivatives
112
Association’s model documentation for derivative transactions.
Another illustration of concern over financial contagion is in the
realm of global banking. With regard to the interconnection among
banks, there is substantial concern that the insolvency of a major
113
foreign banking enterprise may cause U.S. banks to also fail. Due
to the tremendous increase in global finance and banking
commencing in the late 1970s and 1980s, Congress recognized that
banking regulation must incorporate an international consensus on
capital adequacy ratios.114 Congress assigned the responsibility of
capital adequacy to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
by enacting the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983
(ILSA)115: “ILSA was a direct response to the international debt
crisis and its impact on the U.S. banking system.”116 ILSA permitted
the Federal Reserve to develop, negotiate and implement, in
conjunction with foreign central banks, capital adequacy standards
and the adoption of uniform rules for commercial banks.117 This
emphasis on international agreement was an acknowledgement that
the Federal Reserve’s power to prevent domestic financial implosions
was limited and insufficient without agreement with foreign central

111. Id.
112. See Christopher J. Mertens, Australian Insolvency Law and the 1992 ISDA Master
Agreement—Catalyst, Reaction and Solution, 15 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 233, 233 (2006).
113. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Framework for Foreign-Back Insolvency: An Open
Research Agenda, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 81 (2005).
114. OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms: Capital Adequacy Ratio, http://stats.oecd.org/
glossary/detail.asp?ID=6193 (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (“The capital adequacy ratio is an
analytical construct in which regulatory capital is the numerator and risk-weighted assets is the
denominator. The minimum ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets is set at 8 percent
(the core regulatory capital element should be at least 4 percent). These ratios are considered
the minimum necessary to achieve the objective of securing over time soundly-based and
consistent capital ratios for all international banks.”).
115. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1153, 1278
(1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
116. SUSAN BURHOUSE ET AL., BASEL AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL REGULATION:
MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK (2003), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/
011403fyi.html.
117. See International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 908, 97 Stat.
1153, 1278 (1983) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).

04__SLAWOTSKY.DOC

2006]

3/9/2007 10:05 AM

THE NEW GLOBAL FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE

149

banks.118 The continued recognition of the growing risk to the global
economy due to banking integration led to the 1988 international
agreement by central bank governors of the Group of Ten (G-10)
countries on capital adequacy known as the Basel Capital Accord and
119
a current proposed Basel II.
IV. ACTA LITIGATION
A. The Alien Tort Claims Act
Despite existing for over two hundred years, the ATCA had
120
been, until 1980, a “stealth statute” and rarely invoked.
Notwithstanding the brevity of its words,121 the statute has been found
difficult to interpret. One court noted that there is “complexity
involved in the application of this cryptic statute in the context of a
globalized economy and evolving international organizations.”122 The
ATCA provides federal jurisdiction for any civil action by an alien
123
and for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations or a
124
treaty of the United States. The statute permits aliens to file claims
against American and foreign corporations and individuals for select
125
tortious conduct committed in foreign countries.
To be actionable, the tort must constitute a violation of the “law
126
127
Conduct
of nations” or violate a treaty of the United States.

118. See 1 MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER, REGULATION OF FOREIGN
BANKS: UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL 4-4 (1995) (explaining that when the first “riskbased capital proposal [by the Federal Reserve pursuant to ILSA] was issued for public
comment in early 1986,” the consensus “emphasized the importance of achieving uniformity of
capital standards with other countries”).
119. The Federal Reserve Board, Basel II Capital Accord, http://www.federalreserve.gov/
generalinfo/basel2/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2006).
120. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting the dearth of cases
that had previously arisen pursuant to the ATCA).
121. ACTA reads, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
122. Maugein v. Newmont Mining, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D. Colo. 2004) (rejecting
defamation of character as actionable under the ATCA).
123. There is no bright-line test and courts have grappled with the issue of which torts are
cognizable.
124. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
125. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720-21 (2004).
126. See Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 14 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Flores v. S. Peru Copper
Corp., 406 F.3d 65, 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (depublished).
127. Flores, 406 F.3d at 79.
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violates the “law of nations” if it contravenes “well-established,
128
universally recognized norms of international law.” These norms
129
must be “specific, universal and obligatory.” If a norm is binding on
nations it is referred to as a “jus cogens.”130 A jus cogens violation
131
satisfies, but is not required to meet, the ATCA requirement.
Therefore, a tort can be cognizable if the conduct violates a treaty or
a universally acknowledged norm of international law, whether or not
the norm is a jus cogens.
Many torts have been rejected as predicate offenses permitted
under the ATCA. Non-compliance with a particular form of
representative government is not considered a violation of the law of
132
Brief arbitrary detention has also been found not
nations.
133
134
actionable. Sexual violence by itself has been rejected.
Courts have held that seizure of property within a nation’s
borders does not constitute a violation, unless the actor is acting
135
Examples of commercial conduct that courts
under color of law.
have specifically held not actionable because they failed to meet the
136
137
standard of international consensus include fraud, conversion,
138
139
140
negligence and wrongful death, defamation, child custody, and
libel.141
1. Modern History of ATCA Litigation. The current wave of
ATCA litigation can be traced to the Second Circuit’s landmark
142
decision in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala. In Filártiga, the central issue was

128. See Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980)).
129. In re Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
130. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 945 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003).
131. Id. at 945 n.15.
132. Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F. 3d 145, 151 (1st Cir. 2005).
133. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (2004).
134. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2005).
135. See Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 448-49 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(f) (1987)).
136. Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1995).
137. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
138. Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978).
139. Maugein v. Newmont Mining Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 (D. Colo. 2004).
140. Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978).
141. Akbar v. New York Magazine Co., 490 F. Supp. 60, 63 (D.D.C. 1980).
142. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). In Filártiga, two members of a Paraguayan family brought
suit against a former Paraguayan police inspector for the torture and death of a third family
member. Id. The court held that “deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official

04__SLAWOTSKY.DOC

2006]

3/9/2007 10:05 AM

THE NEW GLOBAL FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE

151

whether torture constituted a “violation of the law of nations,” thus
143
If the plaintiff could
allowing plaintiffs’ ATCA suit to proceed.
establish an international consensus with respect to torture’s illegality
pursuant to customary international law, the torture claims would be
actionable.
Filártiga held that to be cognizable pursuant to the ATCA, a
norm of international law must constitute a universal mutual
144
concern : “It is only where the nations of the world have
demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely several,
concern, by means of express international accords, that a wrong
generally recognized becomes an international law violation within
the meaning of the [Alien Tort Statute].”145 The court held that to be
a cognizable claim, the international law violation must be one that is
universally condemned.146 Pursuant to Filártiga, only concerns of a
mutual dimension, rather than one of several concern, will be
147
cognizable.
In analyzing whether torture was a violation of international law,
the court found that the “law of nations” is not rigid, but flexible, and
148
The Second
reflects an evolving standard of international law.
Circuit noted that new norms of customary law may arise: “[T]he
courts are not to prejudge the scope of the issues that the nations of
the world may deem important to . . . their common good.”149 This

authority” violates the law of nations, and that ATCA jurisdiction was proper. Id at 878. In
arriving at this holding, the court interpreted Supreme Court precedents as establishing four
propositions: first, the law of nations is part of federal common law, and cases arising under the
law of nations arise under the laws of the United States as required by Article III of the
Constitution, see id. at 880; second, the “law of nations ‘may be ascertained by consulting the
works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of
nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law,’” id. at 880 (citing United
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)); third, a norm must command “the
general assent of civilized nations” to be part of the law of nations, see id. at 881 (citing The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)); and fourth, the law of nations must be interpreted
“not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today,” id.
at 881 (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 198 (1796)).
143. Id. at 878.
144. See id. at 888.
145. Id.
146. See generally id.
147. Id. Similarly, in Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., the Second Circuit stated that “the law
of nations” in ATCA litigation refers to customary international law, meaning “those rules that
States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.”
343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (depublished).
148. See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 887.
149. Id. at 888.

04__SLAWOTSKY.DOC

152

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/9/2007 10:05 AM

[Vol 17:131

broad and flexible definition meant that new torts might become
actionable if there developed an international acknowledgement with
respect to the conduct. The court also held that torture was
actionable under the ATCA. Significantly, Filártiga’s far-reaching
150
Filártiga was
implication was endorsed by the Supreme Court.
followed by several high-profile cases against both foreign nationals
and corporations.151
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court confirmed the
ATCA as a potential vehicle to remedy certain outrageous conduct.152
Rejecting the expansive view of the ATCA argued by plaintiffs’
counsel, the Court ruled the ATCA was jurisdictional and did not
provide a statutory cause of action.153 However, the Court found the
ATCA did vest federal courts with the power to hear violations of the
law of nations, which is incorporated into federal common law,
thereby providing the cause of action in ATCA litigation.154 The
Court found that the scope of the claims authorized by that statute
155
was limited, and approved a conservative approach to ascertaining
the precise violations actionable under the ATCA.156 The Court
limited § 1350 (the ACTA) to suits that “rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable” to the torts recognized by the First
157
Congress as violating the law of nations. The paradigm violations
noted by the Court were offenses against ambassadors, violations of
safe conducts, and piracy.158 However, the Court, citing Filártiga, held
that international law violations must be evaluated in terms of current
159
norms, not the norms of the eighteenth century. Lower courts were

150. See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
151. See Joel Slawotsky, Doing Business Around the World: Corporate Liability Under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1065, 1074-76 (discussing post-Filártiga cases).
152. 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004). The Court underscored the validity of the ATCA in Rasul v.
Bush, where the Court affirmed that the prisoners detained at Guantánamo might potentially
use the ATCA to file actions. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). Thus, according to the Court, aliens
detained as terror suspects may bring suit against U.S. officials for violations of international
law. Id. at 468.
153. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713.
154. Id. at 720.
155. Id. at 724.
156. Id. at 725.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 720. Some have argued that terrorism is substantially equivalent to piracy. See
Mwani v. Bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Terrorism is a colorable claim under the
ATCA.).
159. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
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provided with the ability to approve previously unrecognized torts if
160
Following
the conduct becomes the subject of universal concern.
Sosa, major corporations continued to face ATCA litigation,161 with
many of the cases demonstrating a continued difficulty in applying the
162
ATCA, causing the courts to issue conflicting rulings.
2. The Law of Nations. When plaintiffs base their ATCA
claims on the law of nations, rather than on a treaty, they must
demonstrate that defendants’ conduct breached a universal norm of
163
international law, meaning a norm that is “specific, universal and
164
A norm is universal and obligatory if: (1) no state
obligatory.”
condones the act in question and there is a recognizable universal
consensus of prohibition against it; (2) there are sufficient criteria to
determine whether a given action constitutes an occurrence of the
prohibited act and thus violates the norm; and (3) the prohibition is
non-dirigible and thus binding at all times upon all persons.165
The law of nations “results from a general and consistent practice
of states which is followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.”166 Sosa did not articulate an easy method for courts to
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (international oil
company defendant); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(ATCA claims against American chemical corporations); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346
F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (banking defendants).
162. Courts have arrived at conflicting decisions on a variety of ATCA issues. Compare In
re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (war crimes and crimes against humanity
have no statute of limitations), with Cabello v. Fernández-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005)
(statute of limitations on ATCA claims is ten years); also compare Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408
F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005) (torture is not actionable under the ATCA), with In re Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.1994) (torture actionable under
the ATCA); also compare In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 52 (ATCA encompasses
aiding and abetting liability), with In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 538
(ATCA is limited to direct liability).
163. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he ATS
applies only to shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized principles of
international law . . . . [Plaintiff] fails to show that these treaties and agreements enjoy universal
acceptance in the international community.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (“It is only where the nations of the
world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual and not merely several, concern, by means
of express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international
law violation within the meaning of the statute.”).
164. Beanal, 197 F.3d at 165.
165. See generally In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1475.
166. Jama v. U.S. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998) (“The law of nations ‘may be
ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the
general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that
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interpret the law of nations. Indeed as one court stated, “it would
have been unquestionably preferable for the lower federal courts if
167
the Supreme Court had created a bright-line rule.”
Despite this, courts will usually have jurisdiction if plaintiffs can
allege an international law violation of joint, rather than several,
168
concern, as evidenced by agreements and regulations. In evaluating
whether a specific claim meets the jurisdictional requirements of the
ATCA, a court will consider: (1) whether the complaint identifies a
specific, universal, and obligatory norm of international law; (2)
whether that norm is recognized by the United States; and (3)
whether there has been a violation of the same.169 Courts faced with
making this determination may be guided by judicial decisions
enforcing the law of nations, the work of jurists, and the general usage
and practice of nations.170 Courts may also look at non self-executing
treaties and international agreements to determine accepted norms of
171
international law.
B. The ATCA and Corporate Fraud
1. Rulings on Fraud Prior to Vencap. Historically, courts have
been reluctant to expand ATCA liability into the commercial realm.
The case often cited as the initial authority for this refusal is the
172
In Lopes, the
nearly fifty-year old holding in Lopes v. Schroder.
court found that the unseaworthiness of a ship was not actionable

law.’”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987).
167. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 547.
168. Courts may disagree over what constitutes “universal acceptance” under international
law. Compare Mendonca v. Tidewater, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 299, 301-02 (E.D. La. 2002), aff’d,
33 F. App’x. 705 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that racial discrimination does not violate the law of
nations because the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination does not enjoy
“universal acceptance”), with Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 439-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(“Systematic racial discrimination . . . is proscribed as [a] violation[] of international standards
in various international instruments.”).
169. See Nat’l Coal. Gov’t. of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
170. Kadić v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Beanal v. FreeportMcMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1999); Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,
714-15 (9th Cir. 1992); In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d
1160, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
171. Sarei v. Rio Tinto P.L.C., 456 F.3d 1069, 1078 (9th Cir. 2006) (“As for the UNCLOS
[United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] claim, the treaty has been ratified by at
least 149 nations, which is sufficient for it to codify customary international law that can provide
the basis of an ATCA claim.”).
172. 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
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pursuant to the ATCA.173 The Lopes court found the principle of
unseaworthiness was not a universal concern but rather a doctrine of
174
Lopes
American law, or, a several concern of the United States.
noted that the only torts cognizable under the ATCA were those
175
Since
affecting nations generally, or, those of a joint concern.
unseaworthiness was not part of the law of nations, it could not be a
predicate for filing suit under the ATCA.176
Similarly, in Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,177 the
court decided that an American insurance company’s allegedly
fraudulent conduct in refusing to pay the proceeds of an insurance
policy to a foreign plaintiff did not constitute a violation of the law of
nations.178 The court, citing Lopes, rejected ATCA jurisdiction,
stating, “A violation of the law of nations means a violation of those
standards by which nations regulate their dealings with one another
inter se.”179 The court noted that the “personal injury actions such as
those found in the Lopes case do not raise the specter of widespread
international impact [and similarly] actions to recover funds based
upon life insurance contract obligations do not impress this Court as
being of the caliber of the cases which have been allowed recourse”
pursuant to the ATCA.180
In Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, Inc., plaintiffs claimed that the
181
They
defendant oil corporation committed fraud against them.
alleged that the defendant promised to train them as company
managers, but instead trained them to be employed as service station
attendants.182 The court held that the purported deception failed to
constitute a tort in violation of the law of nations and was thus not
183
actionable under the ATCA.
173. See id. at 295.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 297.
176. See id. (holding that the torts cognizable under the ATCA include violations “of those
standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an
individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good and/or in
dealing inter se”).
177. 259 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
178. Id. at 327.
179. Id. at 328.
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1973).
182. Id. at 143-44.
183. Id. at 145. See also Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir.
1978) (holding that air crashes do not fall within the ambit of the ATCA after plaintiff estate of
a victim of an airplane crash filed a tort action against an airline for wrongful death).
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2. The Second Circuit’s Vencap Ruling. While the abovereferenced cases demonstrate the historical reluctance of courts to
permit ATCA claims based upon commercial liability, the Second
Circuit’s ruling in Vencap is particularly important because it has
been cited as precedent for cases holding corporate fraud not
cognizable under the ATCA.184 In Vencap, a foreign investment fund
filed suit against a foreign corporation for “fraud, conversion, and
185
corporate waste.” The court held that although conduct leading to
fraud was universally condemned,186 to be actionable, the conduct
must constitute a violation of the law of nations.187 The Second
188
Circuit, noting that the law of nations “must be narrowly read,” held
that while laws against theft are part of the legal system of many
states,189 theft was not a violation of the law of nations pursuant to
190
the Lopes standard. Citing to Lopes, Vencap stated a violation of
the law of nations arises when “[a] violation by one or more
individuals of those standards, rules, or customs [occurs] (a) affecting
the relationship between states or between an individual and a
foreign state and (b) used by those states for their common good
and/or in dealings inter se.”191
According to Vencap, the international financial fraud at issue
was not actionable since the conduct failed to constitute a violation of
international law.192 While Vencap was not sanctioning fraud, it found
that the factual underpinning of the particular claim failed to
constitute a universal concern.193

184. See, e.g., Arndt v. Union Bank of Switz., 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2004);
Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995); DeWit v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,
570 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding an employment dispute not actionable).
185. ITT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001, 1003 (2d Cir. 1975).
186. Id. at 1015 (referencing the prohibition against theft in the Ten Commandments).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing Lopes v. Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963)).
192. Id. at 1015. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala referenced Vencap and noted Vencap’s statement
that even if every nation’s law forbids theft, that would not mean that “the Eighth
Commandment, ‘Thou Shalt not steal’ . . . [is incorporated into] the law of nations.” 630 F.2d
876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015).
193. See Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015.
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In Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
194
dismissal of claims that banking fraud violated the law of nations.
The court held that “looting of a bank by its insiders, and
misrepresentations about the bank’s financial condition, have never
been in the traditional classification of international law. These are
garden variety violations of statutes, banking regulations, and
common law.”195 The Hamid court cited to Vencap and held that the
196
fraudulent conduct did not violate the law of nations.
In Arndt v. Union Bank of Switzerland, the court reiterated that
197
The court
financial fraud was not actionable under the ATCA.
conceded that the question of whether a tort violates customary
international law “has found no easy answer.”198 Nevertheless, the
199
court, citing to Vencap and several other cases, joined other courts
200
in holding fraud not actionable. The Arndt court concluded that the
fraud in the case did not constitute “‘wrongs’ expressed by mutual
201
concern and reflected in ‘international accords.’” Arndt stated that
to be actionable the violation must be of a rule: “(1)‘universally
recognized’ by states; (2) establish[ing] a legal obligation; (3)
address[ing] wrongs that are of mutual, and not merely individual,
concern to states; and (4) specific enough to be enforced.”202

194. 51 F.3d 1411, 1414 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the complaint alleged that defendants
violated the law of nations by causing the bank to loan money to criminals and to insiders and
bribing or lying to bank regulators).
195. Id. at 1418.
196. Id. (citing Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1015). The court stated:
We agree with the view of the Second Circuit, as stated in IIT: we cannot subscribe to
plaintiffs’ view that the Eighth Commandment “Thou shalt not steal” is part of the law
of nations. While every civilized nation doubtless has this as a part of its legal system,
a violation of the law of nations arises only when there has been “a violation by one or
more individuals of those standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship
between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those
states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se.”
Id.
197. 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
198. Id. at 138.
199. Id. at 139-40 (citing Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 142, 145 (7th Cir. 1973);
De Wit v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 570 F. Supp. 613, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Canadian
Overseas Ores Ltd. v. Compania De Acero Del Pacifico, 528 F. Supp. 1337, 1347 (S.D.N.Y.
1982)).
200. Id. at 139-41.
201. Id. at 141 (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2003)
(depublished)).
202. Id. at 139 (citing Flores, 343 F.3d at 154-56; Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d
Cir. 1980)).

04__SLAWOTSKY.DOC

158

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/9/2007 10:05 AM

[Vol 17:131

The post-Vencap rulings are not persuasive for three reasons.
First, these courts have not paid attention to Filártiga’s specific
notation that the law of nations may change over time, thus leaving
the possibility that over time, corporate fraud may become the
subject of mutual concern, thereby constituting a violation of an
international norm.203 Second, the violations this Article suggests as
being cognizable are not routine fraud but rather the type of conduct
204
which involves “the specter of widespread international impact”
and leads to an “Enron-like” financial collapse, where substantial
wealth is destroyed, accompanied by other severe loss such as
elimination of thousands of jobs and tremendous collateral economic
damage. Third, as will be demonstrated below, by the very standards
articulated by Filártiga, Flores, and Arndt, severe corporate fraud now
satisfies the criteria of international mutual concern for finding
jurisdiction under the ATCA.
V. REASONS TO MOVE BEYOND AN AUTOMATIC
FINDING OF NO LIABILITY
Today’s international financial problems—corporate accounting
and fraud, terrorism, organized crime, money laundering, banking
failures, and securities fraud—are universally recognized wrongs of
205
Severe financial fraud that could lead to megamutual concern.
meltdowns is a substantial joint concern expressed in international
agreements, cooperation, and accords. Indeed, the prevention of
financial fraud is the subject of numerous international agreements,
and cooperation, and is recognized as a pillar of maintaining global
financial order. All civilized nations have a significant self-interest in
maintaining economic order and the prevention of financial fraud is
now a universal concern.206
Across the globe, government institutions have formed networks
of their own, ranging from the Basel Committee of Central Bankers

203. See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
204. Valanga v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
205. See generally E. Anthony Wayne, Internationalizing the Fight, EJOURNAL USA 6 (Sept.
2004), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0904/ijee/ijee0904.pdf (discussing the
Global War on terrorism finance).
206. See generally infra notes 236-65 (referencing the specific international agreements and
accords listing corporate fraud as a major global concern and developing methods to combat
such activity).
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to ties between law enforcement agencies and securities regulators.207
These concerns over corporate fraud are (1) recognized universally;
(2) establish legal requirements; (3) relate to obligations that are of
mutual concern; and (4) specific and enforceable.208 Therefore, under
the very governing standards articulated by Filártiga, Vencap, and
Arndt, “Enron-like” corporate criminal fraud should be actionable
under the ATCA.
A. The Supreme Court’s Approval of the Second Circuit’s Holding
that the Law of Nations Must Adapt to New Conditions
1. The Filártiga Holding that International Law Evolves with
Changing Conditions. In the Second Circuit’s Filártiga ruling, the
court stated that to be actionable under the ATCA, the conduct must
constitute a violation of an international norm that reflects a concern
209
The court stated that a norm must “command the
to all nations.
‘general assent of civilized nations’” to be part of the law of nations
and that the law of nations must be interpreted “not as it was in 1789,
but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world
today.”210
The crucial holding in Filártiga was the acknowledgement that
norms of international law do change over time. The court was
saying in effect that what might not be a violation of international law
today might be so held in the future.
2. The Supreme Court’s Endorsement of Filártiga. In Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court specifically commented with
approval on Filártiga, leaving no doubt that the Second Circuit’s
interpretation that the law of nations evolves over time is the correct
approach. The Court held: “The position we take today has been
assumed by some federal courts for 24 years, ever since the Second

207. See General Information on IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about (last visited Aug. 7,
2006) (outlining the basic purposes of the International Organization of Securities Commissions,
which are: (1) “to cooperate together to promote high standards of regulation in order to
maintain just, efficient and sound markets;” (2) “to exchange information on their respective
experiences in order to promote the development of domestic markets;” (3) “to unite their
efforts to establish standards and an effective surveillance of international securities
transactions;” and (4) “to provide mutual assistance to promote the integrity of the markets by a
rigorous application of the standards and by effective enforcement against offenses”).
208. Id.
209. See 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
210. Id. at 881 (emphasis added).
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Circuit decided Filártiga v. Peña-Irala.”211
Sosa held that in
determining the viability of new actions, “we think courts should
require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18thcentury paradigms we have recognized.”212
In addition to the Supreme Court’s validation of the “evolving
law” approach, there is a U.S. Congressional endorsement. In
enacting the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), Congress
enhanced the ATCA through the TVPA, but explicitly stated that the
ATCA “should remain intact to permit suits based on . . . norms that
already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary
213
international law.”
Based on the Supreme Court’s endorsement of Filártiga and the
legislative intent of Congress, conduct that may not have been
cognizable under the ATCA at one time may become actionable at a
later date. While courts have been reluctant to find corporate fraud
214
an actionable tort, the Supreme Court has endorsed an approach
whereby torts other than the three original predicate offenses are
cognizable.215
In deciding whether to find reprehensible conduct actionable
under the ATCA, the issue is whether the conduct is a violation of the
law of nations. Does corporate fraud that causes severe financial
collapse constitute conduct that engenders the condemnation of the
civilized world, thus qualifying it for a violation of an international
norm? As will be discussed below, concerns about egregious financial
fraud and global economic stability have indeed ripened in recent
years and are now universal.
B. Avoiding Financial Collapse is an International Norm
Deterring foreign-based corporate criminal fraud is an issue of
mutual concern.
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan, addressing claims of corporate misconduct, opined that
allegations of corporate fraud “undermine the very basis on which the
211. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004).
212. Id. at 725.
213. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (emphasis
added).
214. See, e.g., IIT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015-16 (2d Cir. 1975); Arndt v. Union Bank of
Switz., 132 F. Supp. 2d 132, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
215. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730-31.
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world’s greatest financial markets thrive.”216 The losses involved in
egregious financial misconduct are no longer containable to a
particular nation. There is a universal consensus that avoiding
financial collapse is a shared mutual interest of all civilized nations.
The entire international community has a paramount interest in
preventing staggering loss and the ATCA should be a vehicle to help
deter such fraud.
Anti-corruption initiatives, barely in existence until the last
several years, have reached a critical mass.217 The International
Organization of Security Commissions (IOSCO), an organization
218
composed of over one hundred members, has several working
groups, one of which is focused on multinational disclosure and
219
In February 2005, the IOSCO reported that the
accounting.
integrity and foundation of the global economy was in danger due to
rampant high-profile corporate fraud worldwide.220 The IOSCO
Report commented that these corporate scandals were not confined

216. The Associated Press, Greenspan: Companies Must Restore Trust, MSNBC.COM, Apr.
16, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4757117/.
217. See, e.g., Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, Anticorruption Timeline Fact Sheet, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/
31263.htm (last visited June 22, 2006) (listing international conferences and meetings focused on
combating corruption).
218. Ordinary Members of IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/lists/display_members.cfm?
memID=1&orderBy=none (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
219. See IOSCO Working Committees, http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=
workingcmts (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
220. TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, STRENGTHENING CAPITAL
MARKETS AGAINST FINANCIAL FRAUD ii (2005), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD192.pdf. The report stated:
Over the past several years, a series of very high-profile financial scandals involving
large publicly-traded companies appeared to create doubts in the minds of investors
throughout the world about the integrity of global capital markets. While, at first, the
largest of these scandals seemed limited to the United States, more recent events—
including the December 2003 discovery of financial improprieties at Parmalat S.P.A. in
Italy followed by other scandals in various jurisdictions—demonstrated that this
phenomenon was not peculiar to any one market and the concerns raised by these
financial scandals were truly global in nature. Members of the Technical Committee of
the International Organization of Securities Commissions recognize that these investor
doubts must be answered if financial stability and economic prosperity are to be
maintained. Consequently, the Technical Committee formed a Task Force of
Chairmen charged with investigating the issues uncovered by these financial scandals
and identifying any broad trends. It was also tasked with making recommendations
about the enhancements securities regulators should undertake to ensure that the
current regulatory framework remains robust and serves to protect the integrity of
global capital markets, restore investor confidence, and combat financial fraud,
notwithstanding significant changes in the marketplace.
Id.
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to any particular jurisdiction, but rather were global in nature.221 The
report also emphasized that the entire global economic structure was
222
As will be
at risk to of collapse due to financial fraud.
demonstrated below, the prevention of corporate fraud and
avoidance of financial collapse is a universal concern.
C. The United States
The United States recognizes that economic security forms a
crucial underpinning of overall national security. Indeed, the Secret
Service’s second directive, after protection of the President, is the
223
Congress enacted
safeguarding of the American financial system.
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), which regulates
the foreign activities of U.S. companies.224 The FCPA contains
225
specific accounting provisions that require proper recording of
transactions and disposition of assets.226
Interestingly, in an
amendment, Congress required the President to consult with other
nations and negotiate an international agreement on fighting
corporate corruption.227 This emphasis on international cooperation
underscores that corporate fraud is not a several concern but a
universal one.
In the wake of Enron and other scandals, the Corporate Fraud
228
Task Force (CFTF) was created by Executive Order in July of 2002.
The CFTF was established to direct the prosecution of serious
financial crimes and formulate recommendations on preventing major
corporate fraud.229 In addition, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX)230 to reform corporate governance vesting regulators with
broad powers to impose new accountability rules on senior
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. See United States Secret Service, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.secret
service.gov/faq.shtml (last visited June 20, 2006) (“Today, the Secret Service’s mission is two
fold: protection of the President, Vice President and others; and protection of our nation’s
financial system.”).
224. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
225. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(b) (2000).
226. Id.
227. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 5003(d)(1), 102 Stat. 1415, 1424 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
228. Exec. Order. No. 13,271, 3 C.F.R. § 13271 (2003).
229. Id.
230. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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management,231 to deter fraudulent financial statements,232 and to
233
SOX codifies
improve public accounting oversight mechanisms.
234
financial crime as a federal criminal violation. Significant fines and
penalties are contained in SOX.235
D. International Concern
236

As concerns over financial wrongdoing have spread globally,
many countries and international organizations have articulated
concerns about corporate mischief that could cause financial
implosion on a global scale. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
has been involved in stabilizing nations involved in financial
meltdowns.237 The IMF has declared that corporate fraud and
corruption are destabilizing to the global economy and has adopted
guidelines to avoid financial meltdowns and to improve
transparency.238 The World Bank has established the Oversight
Committee on Fraud and Corruption,239 runs integrity workshops,240
241
and urges reporting of fraud.
The IOSCO has articulated regulatory principles and standards
of auditor oversight, corporate governance, and transparency in an
242
attempt to prevent financial fraud. The IOSCO is working with the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
243
(OECD), as well as other international organizations and law

231. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 7243-7244 (Supp. III 2003).
232. See, e.g., § 7241.
233. See § 7211.
234. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (Supp. III 2003).
235. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. III 2003); see also Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron
to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 378-79
(2003) (providing examples of criminal penalties in tables 1 and 2).
236. See James Cox, Asia Shakes Up Cozy, Corrupt Business Practices, USA TODAY, Jan.
28, 1998, at 4B.
237. See What the IMF Does, http://www.imf.org/external/work.htm (last visited Sept. 13,
2006).
238. See News Brief, IMF, IMF Adopts Guidelines Regarding Governance Issues (Aug. 4,
1997), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1997/nb9715.htm.
239. The World Bank Group, Helping Prevent Corruption World-Wide, http://www.world
bank.org/html/extdr/spring99/corruption-pb.htm (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 220, at ii-iii.
243. The OECD responded to the spreading concern over international bribery by passing
the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business
Transactions. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business
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enforcement agencies in an attempt to encourage international
244
cooperation against corporate fraud. The IOSCO notes that today’s
global economy demands international cooperation in the fight
against financial machinations.245
In 1989, the Group of Seven major industrialized nations
organized to discuss money laundering and set up the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF).246 The FATF drafted recommendations
that are regularly updated to reflect changing financial conditions.247
The FATF defines certain categories of offenses that reflect
international norms. Included in this list of criminal misconduct are:
fraud, piracy, and market manipulation, as well as other offenses.248
The FATF’s recommendations are a reflection of the world’s mutual
concern about improper financial conduct.
In 1996, the Organization of American States (OAS) passed the
249
Inter-American Convention against Corruption (OAS Convention).
The OAS is a multinational organization representing nearly forty
nations.250 The OAS Convention requires parties to the Convention
to consider the applicability of measures within their own system
251
requiring corporations to maintain accurate financial records and
provide transparency.252
The goals of the European Community Securities Law are to
protect investors and to ensure uniform standards.253 This requires an
avoidance of financial crisis that can erode the stability of the market.
The European Union (EU) utilizes Directives, conventions, and
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,2340,en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html.
244. TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 220, at v, vii, ix,
29.
245. Id. at 29 (“These scandals have been notable not just because of their cross-border
nature of the alleged wrongdoing, but also because of the cross-border enforcement cooperation
among securities regulators and law enforcement authorities that followed.”).
246. See About the FATF, www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,2966,en_3225039_32236836_1_1_1_1_
1,00.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
247. Id.
248. See FATF, 40 Recommendations Glossary, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/glossary/0,2586,en_
32236889_35433764_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
249. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO.
105-39, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-58.html.
250. About the OAS, http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.
org/documents/eng/memberstates.asp (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).
251. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 249, art. III, cl. 10.
252. See id. art. III, cls. 4,5,9,10, art. XVI.
253. Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The
Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT’L L.J. 185, 215 (1990).
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regulations to advance these goals. Some examples of Directives are
254
ones that require certain financial information to be published and
ones that require financial disclosures to be reviewed by qualified
auditors and establish professional requirements of the auditors.255
Other Directives prohibit companies from deluding the market with
256
inaccurate or misleading information or obligate disclosure and
257
transparency rules.
Another example of a European Directive is
the Interim Reports Directive, which mandates that companies which
have publicly traded shares provide semi-annual balance sheets to
provide investors with information.258
European nations have also expressed their concern about fraud
generally with the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of the
Council of Europe.259 Other examples are the various EU directives
and agreements aimed at preventing corporate fraud and money
laundering.260 Serious fraud and corruption are considered criminal
activities.
The U.N. General Assembly has established an ad-hoc
committee to investigate the viability of a U.N. convention against
261
In addition, the Declaration against Corruption and
corruption.
Bribery in International Commercial Transactions has become a U.N.
262
The Resolution encourages nations to establish antiResolution.
corruption measures.263

254. Council Directive 83/349, art. 7(2)(b)(bb), 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1, 4 (EEC).
255. Council Directive 84/253, arts. 2-6, 1984 O.J (L 126) 20, 21-26 (EEC).
256. Council Directive 2003/6, art. 2(c), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16, 20 (EC).
257. See Council Directive 2004/39, art. 25, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 21 (EC).
258. Alexander B. St. John, The Regulation of Cross-Border Public Offerings of Securities in
the European Union: Present And Future, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 239, 246 (2001).
259. See Criminal Law Convention on Corruption pmbl., Jan. 27, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 173.
260. See Financial Crime, The EU Single Market, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
company/financial-crime/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).
261. See generally U.N. Gen. Assembly [UNGA], Ad Hoc Comm. for the Negotiation of a
Convention Against Corruption, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a
Convention Against Corruption on the Work of Its First to Seventh Sessions, ¶ I, U.N. Doc.
A/55/422 (Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention_corruption/
session_7/422e.pdf; UNGA, Ad Hoc Comm. for the Negotiation of a Convention Against
Corruption, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention Against
Corruption on the Work of Its First to Seventh Sessions, Addendum: Interpretative Notes for the
Official Records (Travaux Préparatiores) of the Negotiation of the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption, U.N. Doc. A/58/422/Add.1 (Oct. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention_corruption/session_7/422add1.pdf.
262. G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/191 (Dec. 16, 1996).
263. Id. ¶ 3.
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As detailed above, concerns over corporate fraud have led to
widespread international agreement and cooperation on corporate
financial abuse over the last thirty years. These concerns are not
relegated to one or two nations, but rather are joint and mutual as
264
The
evidenced by universal consensus and substantial agreement.
fight against corporate fraud reflects concerns that: “(1) [are]
‘universally recognized’ by states; (2) establish a legal obligation; (3)
address wrongs that are of mutual, and not merely individual, concern
to states; and (4) [are] specific enough to be enforced.”265 It is beyond
peradventure that civilized nations share a mutual concern regarding
the avoidance of corporate fraud. As evidenced by the accords and
agreements of leading global organizations, such as the IMF, World
Bank, and others, as well as the laws and international cooperation of
many nations, financial misconduct that leads to a mega-meltdown
and collapse constitutes a violation of an international norm.
E. Select Enron-Type Conduct
It is crucial to note that this Article is not suggesting that conduct
encompassing ordinary market risk or garden-variety fraud should be
actionable pursuant to the ATCA.266 Only outrageous conduct with
an international impact and which results in severe wealth destruction
should be actionable under the ATCA. The category of claims
suggested in this article capable of triggering jurisdiction are limited
to “Enron-like” fraud.

264. See, e.g., TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 220, at
iii. The report states:
[I]n modern capital markets, where capital flows easily across national borders, crossborder enforcement cooperation perhaps is the single most powerful tool securities
regulators and law enforcement authorities have at their disposal to prevent, deter,
detect and prosecute cross-border financial fraud. In the process of reviewing the key
regulatory issues highlighted by these recent financial scandals, the Technical
Committee determined that, in many cases, regulatory principles or standards designed
to address the weaknesses identified in this Report have already been developed. In
other words, the Technical Committee is of the view that, in very many cases, there
already is a widespread consensus about what regulatory problems exist and how these
problems can be solved.
Id.
265. Arndt v. Union Bank of Switz., 342 F. Supp. 2d 132, 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Flores
v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 154-56 (2d Cir. 2003) (depublished) and Filártiga v. PeñaIrala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980)).
266. Market risk is the “risk of losses in on- and off-balance-sheet positions arising from
movements in market prices.” BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, OVERVIEW OF THE
AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS 1 (1996), available
at www.bis.org/publ/bcbs23.pdf.
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CONCLUSION
Recent years have witnessed a surge in global financial deception
resulting in substantial wealth evisceration. While the types of
conduct found to be cognizable under the ATCA to date have not
included severe corporate financial wrongdoing, these prior rulings
do not reflect our current financially intertwined world. Powerful
reasons exist for permitting the invocation of ATCA jurisdiction in
limited circumstances for corporate financial misconduct. The
quintessential example of the type of deception where ATCA
jurisdiction is appropriate is the conduct that caused the Enron
debacle.
Avoiding “Enron-like” financial implosions, failed banking
systems, the evisceration of tens of billions of dollars worth of market
value, the destruction of retirement savings on a grand scale,
plummeting real estate valuations, and economic collapse based upon
corporate fraud constitutes an international norm. All countries have
a crucial interest in maintaining world economic prosperity. The
foundation of world economic stability is at stake.
Since
globalization, the financial services revolution, and global market
integration have brought these negative outcomes from being
confined locally to the specter of international contagion, the ATCA
should be allowed to form the basis of jurisdiction for the Enron-type
of corporate fraud.

